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Abstract
The central variable of theories of ￿nancial frictions -the external ￿nance premium- is
unobservable. This paper distils the external ￿nance premium from a DSGE model estimated
on US macroeconomic data. Within the DSGE framework, movements in the premium can
be given an interpretation in terms of shocks driving business cycles. A key result is that
the estimate -based solely on non-￿nancial macroeconomic data- picks up over 70% of the
dynamics of lower grade corporate bond spreads. The paper also identi￿es a gain in ￿tting
key macroeconomic aggregates by including ￿nancial frictions in the model and documents
how shock transmission is a⁄ected.
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11 Introduction
The external ￿nance premium is a crucial variable in economics. Few economists would argue that
￿rms can obtain external ￿nance at the risk-free rate. While internal ￿nance is available relatively
cheaply, obtaining external funds -through loans, bonds or equity- implies possibly substantial
costs. Probably the most prevailing explanation for costly external ￿nance is the existence
of asymmetric information, which gives rise to ￿nancial market imperfections. Not only with
respect to ￿rm investment, but also for macroeconomic ￿ uctuations can ￿nancial frictions have
substantial implications, as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) forcefully argue. A major problem for
students of ￿nancial frictions is, however, that the central variable, the external ￿nance premium,
is unobservable.
There are currently two approaches toward tackling the unobservability of the external ￿-
nance premium. The ￿rst approach relies on ￿nding readily available ￿nancial market indicators
that are arguably good indicators for the premium for external ￿nance, such as corporate bond
spreads. The fact that these indicators have substantial predictive content for business cycle
￿ uctuations is often interpreted as evidence for the existence of ￿nancial frictions, e.g. Gertler
and Lown (1999) and Mody and Taylor (2003). Another approach is adopted by Levin et al.
(2004). Using the microeconomic ￿nancial friction embedded in Bernanke et al. (1999), along
with balance sheet and bond market data, they estimate the external ￿nance premium for a
group of listed US ￿rms.
This paper estimates the external ￿nance premium for the US economy. We distil the pre-
mium from a medium-scale Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with ￿nan-
cial frictions, estimated using Bayesian methods. We compare the model-consistent premium
with readily available indicators of the external ￿nance premium and ￿nd it has substantial re-
alistic content. Our framework allows to interpret ￿ uctuations in the external ￿nance premium
in terms of structural shocks driving the economy.
In order to study ￿ uctuations in the external ￿nance premium, we append the widely analyzed
informational friction of Bernanke et al. (1999) to a state-of-the-art DSGE model, that -in the
2absence of ￿nancial frictions- successfully matches key features of the US economy. The baseline
DSGE model is very similar to that of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003,
2005, 2007). Their results indicate that the current strand of DSGE models is able to compete on
empirical grounds with purely data driven approaches, such as (Bayesian) VAR￿ s. The framework
of Bernanke et al. (1999) has been used to investigate a variety of issues in the macroeconomic
literature. Among those, Gertler et al. (2007) analyze the relevance of the ￿nancial accelerator
in open economy crisis episodes. Christiano et al. (2003) incorporate ￿nancial frictions in their
model to analyze the Great Depression. Christensen and Dib (2008), Meier and M￿ller (2006)
and Queijo (2006) use the friction underlying the ￿nancial accelerator to study di⁄erences in the
transmission of a number of structural shocks.
None of the above macroeconomic studies, however, investigate the implications for the exter-
nal ￿nance premium. The primary contribution of this paper lies in providing a model-consistent
estimate of the external ￿nance premium for the US economy. We compare our estimate to readily
available proxies of the premium and ￿nd that it has substantial realistic content. In particular,
even though the estimation uses no ￿nancial information, our estimate strongly comoves with
proxies of the premium. Moreover, we also ￿nd that our estimate of the external ￿nance pre-
mium bears close resemblance to other indicators of strain in the availability of external ￿nance,
such as credit standards (Lown and Morgan, 2006). An advantage of our estimate relative to
other proxies is that within our framework, ￿ uctuations in the external ￿nance premium can
be interpreted in terms of shocks driving the economy. Existing research provides little insight
into the macroeconomic factors that drive ￿ uctuations in the premium for external ￿nance. A
second contribution of the paper is to show how embedding ￿nancial frictions alters the empirical
performance of an otherwise standard DSGE model. We detail how the transmission of shocks
is a⁄ected by ￿ uctuations in the external ￿nance premium. One feature of our model is that
the cyclical properties of the premium change relative to existing research. We attribute this
di⁄erence to the interaction of the ￿nancial friction with both the real frictions and the shocks
in the model.
3The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the log-linearized version of the
model. Section 3 discusses the estimation procedure and results. The paper then focuses on
the implications for the external ￿nance premium (Section 4). Section 5 discusses the relevance
of ￿nancial frictions for the overall model, for the transmission of shocks and for the cyclical
properties of the external ￿nance premium. We conclude in Section 6 and present a number of
broader implications of our ￿ndings.
2 The Model
The model we propose is a version of the standard New Keynesian / New Neoclassical Synthesis
model, analyzed in detail in Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007).
The economy consists of households, ￿nal and intermediate goods producers, and a monetary
authority. Moreover, as in Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2003), we introduce a
￿nancial intermediary, capital goods producers and entrepreneurs.1 Since these models are quite
well-known, we refrain from a full-blown exposition of their ￿rst principles. To make the paper
self-contained, this section presents the log-linearized version of the model that we estimate. For
details, we refer the reader to the original papers.
Households maximize utility by trading o⁄ current consumption with future consumption
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1There are a number of reasons why we focus on the model of Bernanke et al. (1999), rather than alternative
speci￿cations of ￿nancial frictions. The Bernanke et al. (1999) model shares an important characteristic with the
framework of Kyotaki and Moore (1997) in that asset price movements serve to enforce credit market imperfections.
It is the absence of this mechanism that causes Gomes et al. (2003) to discard the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
framework. In particular, the countercyclical behaviour of the external ￿nance premium this model implies is
deemed to be at odds with the data. Faia and Monacelli (2005) and Walentin (2005) provide an insightful
theoretical comparative analysis of the Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) frameworks.
2We assume a negligible role for entrepreneurial consumption, as in Christiano et al. (2003).
4Apart from the standard terms in future consumption and the real interest rate ^ Rt (= ^ Rn
t ￿
Et^ ￿t+1), this particular consumption process derives from habit persistence (of the ￿catching-up
with the Joneses￿form) and non-separable utility in labour (^ Lt) and consumption. Consumption
is more persistent for larger values of the habit parameter h. Moreover, for ￿c > 1, there exists
some complementarity between labour and consumption. The ￿nal term involving ^ "
B
t represents
a shock to the discount factor ￿, a⁄ecting intertemporal substitution decisions.
Households￿labour supply is di⁄erentiated which, in combination with partial indexation of
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where ^ wt and ^ ￿t denote wage and price in￿ ation, respectively. ￿ ￿t is the central bank￿ s in￿ ation
objective. With (Calvo) probability 1￿￿w a household gets to reoptimize its wage in period t. It
does so taking into account both current and future marginal costs. The term in square brackets
bears some resemblance to an error-correction term, in which the actual wage is drawn towards
its ￿ exible price counterpart. The intratemporal trade-o⁄ between consumption and work is
subject to a labour supply shock ^ "
L
t . The lagging terms in the wage equation result from the
partial indexation assumption, parametrized through ￿w. Finally, this speci￿cation also allows
for temporary deviations from the equilibrium wage mark-up ￿w, as captured by the shock ￿W
t .
The ￿rm sector consists of a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods
￿rms. Their output is combined to produce ￿nal goods, which are sold in a perfectly competitive
market. The aggregate conditions resulting from these agents￿optimization are standard. Ag-
gregate supply stems from the typical Cobb-Douglas production function augmented with ￿xed
costs and variable capital utilization:
^ Yt = ￿^ "
A
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where ￿ is one plus the share of ￿xed costs in production, ￿ the capital share in the production
function, and   represents the elasticity of the capital utilization cost function. ^ Kt denotes
5capital and ^ rk
t its rental rate. Variation in total factor productivity is captured by ^ "
A
t .
Labour demand increases with the rental rate of capital and decreases with that of labour:




t + ^ Kt￿1 (4)
Similar to wages, non-reoptimized prices are partially (￿p) indexed to past in￿ ation. Due
to Calvo-signals, each period only a fraction 1 ￿ ￿p of ￿rms gets to reoptimize. The resulting
in￿ ation dynamics are captured by the following process:
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In an environment of price rigidity ￿rms will, in addition to current marginal costs (in square
brackets), take into account expected future marginal costs, giving rise to the forward looking in-
￿ ation term. The backward looking part follows from partial indexation. The term ￿P
t represents
a price mark-up shock.
As in Christiano et al. (2003), capital goods producers work in a perfectly competitive envi-
ronment and face costs to changing the ￿ ow of investment. The capital stock evolves according
to:
^ Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Kt + ￿ ^ It + ￿^ "
I
t (6)
where ￿ is the depreciation rate, ^ It stands for investment and ^ "
I
t represents a shock to the
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where ^ Qt is the real value of installed capital and ’ is the investment adjustment cost parameter.
Entrepreneurs buy the capital stock Kt+1 from capital goods producers at a given price
Qt, using both internal funds (net worth, Nt+1) and loans from the bank. After purchasing
the capital stock entrepreneurs are hit by idiosyncratic shocks that a⁄ect each entrepreneur￿ s
capital holdings. Subsequently, they decide on capital utilization and rent out capital services to
6intermediate goods ￿rms at a rate ^ rk
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where ￿ RK denotes the steady state return to capital and similarly, ￿ rk the steady state rental
rate. Thus far, the model is fairly standard and follows Smets and Wouters (2005), in particular,
closely.
Following the costly state veri￿cation framework of Bernanke et al. (1999), however, entre-
preneurs cannot borrow at the riskless rate. The cost of external ￿nance di⁄ers from the risk-free
rate because entrepreneurial output is unobservable from the point of view of the ￿nancial inter-
mediary. In order to infer the realized return of the entrepreneur, the bank has to pay a (state
veri￿cation) cost. The bank monitors those entrepreneurs that default, pays the cost and seizes
the remaining funds. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs borrow up to the point where the expected
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The parameter ￿ measures the elasticity of the external ￿nance premium to variations in
entrepreneurial ￿nancial health, measured by net worth relative to capital expenditures. The
higher the entrepreneur￿ s stake in the project (i.e. the higher N=QK), the lower the associated
moral hazard. As shown explicitly in Bernanke et al. (1999), the premium over the risk-free
rate the ￿nancial intermediary demands is a negative function of the amount of collateralized net
worth. In case entrepreneurs have su¢ cient net worth to ￿nance the entire capital stock, agency
problems vanish, the risk-free rate and the return to capital coincide, and the model reduces to
the model of Smets and Wouters (2005).3
Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth accumulates according to:
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3One di⁄erence with Smets and Wouters (2006) is the absence of an ￿equity premium shock￿ in our model.
They include this shock as a non-structural proxy for ￿uctuations in the external ￿nance premium. When we
incorporate such a shock in the model with ￿nancial frictions, its variability is drawn to zero.
7where ￿ is the entrepreneurial survival rate and
￿ K
￿ N is the steady state ratio of capital to net
worth (or the inverse leverage ratio).4
The standard goods market equilibrium condition is augmented with terms capturing the
costs of variable capital utilization and bankruptcy:5
^ Yt = cy ^ Ct + ￿ky^ It + "G
t + cutil;t + cbankrupt;t (11)
where cy and ky denote the steady state ratio of consumption and capital to output, and "G
t can
loosely be interpreted as a government spending shock.
As in Smets and Wouters (2003) the model is closed with the following empirical monetary
policy reaction function:
^ Rn
t = ￿ ^ Rn
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
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where the central bank output objective ^ Y
p
t is the ￿ exible price, ￿ exible wage, frictionless credit
market, equilibrium. The ￿rst two terms capture the standard Taylor rule. The terms involving
￿rst di⁄erences can be seen as the allowance for ￿speed limit policies￿ , as in Walsh (2003). The
reaction function also contains two monetary policy shocks. The ￿rst is a temporary interest rate
shock ￿R
t . The second policy shock, ￿￿
t , captures persistent changes in the authority￿ s in￿ ation
target ￿ ￿t (= ￿ ￿t￿1 + ￿￿
t ).
4We rewrite the model without the bankruptcy cost (￿) and default threshold (￿ !) parameters of Bernanke et al.







There are a couple of reasons to do so. First, not all parameters of the contracting problem are separately identi￿ed.
We therefore restrict to estimation of the more commonly analysed parameters. Moreover, it allows one to refrain
from making assumptions about the distribution of idiosynchratic productivity shocks, as well as its parameters.
This approach avoids a number of computational di¢ culties, as in Meier and M￿ller (2006).
5The terms cutil;t =
( ￿ RK￿1+￿)
 ky ^ rk
t , and cbankrupt;t = ky( ￿ RK ￿ ￿ R)(1￿
￿ N
￿ K )( ^ RK
t + ^ Qt￿1 + ^ Kt) measure the costs
associated with variable capital utilization and bankruptcy. Both are small under reasonable parametrizations of
the model, and are therefore typically neglected (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2005; Bernanke et al., 1999).
83 Estimation Results
3.1 Estimation strategy
The log-linearized version of the model is estimated using Bayesian methods. These methods use
information from existing microeconometric and calibration evidence on behavioural parameters
and update it with new information as captured by the likelihood. While estimation serves to
increase the degree of dynamic ￿t of DSGE models it is not guaranteed to provide insight in the
structural parameters of the underlying models. By contrast, purely calibration based approaches
are unlikely to provide a good time-series characterization of the data relative to likelihood-based
approaches. The combination of prior and sample information into a posterior distribution
provides a meaningful compromise between calibration and (likelihood-based) estimation.
We use the priors of Smets and Wouters (2005) for the parameters we share with their model.6
The ￿rst three columns of Table 1 present the prior distributions. For a thorough discussion of
prior elicitation, identi￿cation and estimation methodology, we refer the reader to Smets and
Wouters (2003). We discuss the priors on the ￿nancial accelerator parameters in more detail.
For the steady state premium on external ￿nance ( ￿ RK ￿ R) we use a Normal distribution with
mean equal to 200 basis points, a value commonly used in calibration exercises (e.g. Bernanke et
al., 1999). Its prior standard deviation is set at 80 basis points. In terms of the (quarterly) model,
we assume ￿ RK ￿ Normal(1:0149;0:002):7 We assume ￿ at priors for the remaining parameters
pertaining to ￿nancial frictions. In particular, for ￿, ￿ and
￿ K
￿ N we set Uniform priors. The
standard deviations are set large enough to cover the relevant domains. We set such disperse
priors on the ￿nancial accelerator parameters, since we hope the data are informative in this
respect.
6With respect to the shock variances, we divert from the priors of Smets and Wouters (2005). They employ
Inverse-Gamma prior distributions. When we estimate the model using their priors, the posterior distribution of
one of the shocks￿variance is bimodal, with one mode purely driven by the prior. Since most of the shock variances
do not have clear economic interpretations, we set uniformative priors by means of the Uniform distribution.
7The steady state level of the risk-free interest rate is undisputed throughout current macroeconomic research.
Here too, it is calibrated (or given a very strict prior) such that R = 4% annually.
9We estimate the model on quarterly US data from 1954:1 to 2004:4. The set of observable
variables consists of real GDP, consumption, investment, wages, hours worked, prices and the
short-term interest rate (Y , C, I, W, L, P, R). These variables constitute the set of observables
in Smets and Wouters (2005). Nominal variables are de￿ ated by the GDP-de￿ ator. Aggregate
real variables are expressed in per capita terms. All variables -except hours, in￿ ation and the
interest rate- are linearly detrended. The data are plotted in Figure 1.
In principle, one could estimate the model on an extended dataset. That is, since the model
describes the evolution of ￿nancial variables, the estimation could try to match their behav-
iour as well. There are a number of reasons why we refrain from such a strategy. First, it
allows to assess whether the mere allowance for ￿nancial frictions, and thus a more substantiated
transmission of shocks, delivers a better description of macroeconomic dynamics. Incorporating
￿nancial variables would substantially burden any model comparisons, since the model with-
out ￿nancial frictions is silent about their dynamics. In Section 5, the signi￿cant increase in
the model￿ s marginal likelihood relative to model without credit market imperfections suggests
that the dynamics implied by ￿nancial frictions are indeed consistent with the data. Second,
there is no straightforward analog between the model variables and the data. While the model
assumes a simple loan contract, we interpret the consequent premium to pertain to all forms
of external ￿nance, not just bank loans. The results in Section 4 suggest that this does not
seem an unreasonable approximation. Third, a particular feature of almost all ￿nancial series is
that they pertain to subsets of ￿rms (e.g. listed). This would introduce a discrepancy between
those series and the economy-wide macroeconomic aggregates whose behaviour we are trying to
match. Fourth, we have experimented with numerous ￿nancial variables that could proxy for net
worth or the external ￿nance premium, while introducing additional measurement error in order
to capture the mismatch in ￿rm coverage. We found that their dynamics are not necessarily
consistent with those prescribed by the model (e.g. unrealistic structural parameters) or give
rise to such substantial measurement error that one could doubt the use of incorporating them
in the ￿rst place.8 We therefore dispose of the inclusion of additional ￿nancial variables in the
8Useful proxies of the premium are typically only available for smaller, more recent samples. The external
10estimation procedure.
Posterior simulation is done via a random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm on three chains
of 500000 draws. We monitor convergence in a variety of ways. Within-chain convergence is
assessed following Bauwens et al. (2003). In particular, we track the standardized CUMSUM
statistic and perform an equality in means test between the ￿rst and last 30% of posterior draws
for each parameter. Between-chain convergence is evaluated using the statistics proposed by
Brooks and Gelman (1998).
3.2 Parameter estimates
We present the ￿nancial parameter estimates in the upper part of Table 1. The estimated steady
state rate of return to capital is 1:0133 on a quarterly basis. Converted to a yearly basis, this
implies a premium for external ￿nance of approximately 130 basis points. Moreover, we estimate
￿ to be substantial at 10%. The estimated value of the elasticity is somewhat higher than that of
Meier and M￿ller (2006) and Christensen and Dib (2008). The posterior sample indicates that
a value for ￿ of 5%, frequently used in calibration exercises, is plausible, yet on the low side.
The estimates of the non-￿nancial parameters are reported in the lower part of Table 1.
The table also contains the estimated parameters for the model in the absence of ￿nancial
frictions. Overall, the non-￿nancial parameters are fairly similar across both models.9 Among
the similarities, we ￿nd a considerable amount of rigidity in both wages and prices. Investment
adjustment costs are substantial. We also estimate a signi￿cant elasticity of the capital utilization
cost function. These estimates are in the ballpark of those in the literature (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2005). The parameters that change substantially due to the inclusion of ￿nancial
frictions are those of the preference shock process and the utility function. In particular, we
observe a higher risk aversion and lower habit parameter in the model with ￿nancial frictions.
validation performed in the next section, shows that these could turn out to be informative for estimation of
DSGE model parameters in longer samples.
9Di⁄erences between our estimates and those of e.g. Smets and Wouters (2005) arise because of di⁄erences in
sample period, priors for the shock variances, detrending procedure and minor modelling di⁄erences (such as a
timing di⁄erence in the Taylor rule, or the presence of capital utilization costs in the resource constraint).
11Both parameters serve to make the consumption process (and impulse responses) less persistent.
Apparently, the inclusion of ￿nancial frictions generates su¢ cient internal propagation to account
for such persistence. The preference shock is substantially less volatile, yet also more persistent.
The estimated standard deviation of the investment speci￿c technology shock, ￿(^ "
I
t), in the
model without ￿nancial frictions lies below the highest posterior density region of the baseline
model.
Several diagnostics suggest the individual chains of posterior draws converge. In particular,
after a su¢ ciently long burn-in period, the standardized CUMSUM statistic for all parameters
￿ uctuates around the ￿nal estimate with a relative error of below 10%. Moreover, for each
parameter, a test between the mean of the ￿rst 30% (after burn-in) and last 30% of draws never
rejects the hypothesis of equality. This reinforces the evidence in favour of stability of the draws.
Moreover, di⁄erent initializations of the chain converge to the same stationary distribution. The
algorithm attains an acceptance rate of approximately 30%.
4 The External Finance Premium
One of the reasons why macroeconomic evidence on ￿nancial frictions is scarce is because one
of the central variables of these theories, viz. the external ￿nance premium, is unobservable.
In the present section, we ￿rst estimate the model-consistent premium. As a form of external
validation, we then compare our estimate with a number of observable proxies of the premium.
Finally, we interpret movements in the premium in relation to shocks driving the business cycle.
4.1 A time series of the premium
Figure 2 plots the median smoothed estimate of the external ￿nance premium implied by the
model. Shaded areas denote NBER recessions. From the ￿gure, it is evident that all of the
post-war recessions are preceded by substantial increases in the premium.10 The premium is
10The ￿gure does not contain con￿dence bounds. While the ￿uctuations in the premium are tightly estimated,
the wide posterior density regions for the steady state level estimate of the premium (ranging from around zero
12low relative to its steady state level during most of the seventies and eighties.11 Following this
prolonged period of relatively low external ￿nancing costs, the premium experiences a steady rise
peaking prior to the early nineties recession. After this recession the external ￿nance premium
returns towards its steady state level. Starting in the middle nineties, another surge initiates,
ending with the early millennium slowdown.
4.2 External validation
To what extent does this estimate of the external ￿nance premium relate to other indicators of
the premium suggested in the literature? On the one hand, there are a number of readily available
series that bear on the premium for external ￿nance. Among these are the prime spread (prime
loan rate - federal funds rate) and the corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa), which are available
over a long time span. Gertler and Lown (1999) argue that in the last two decennia, the high-
yield bond spread (<Bbb-Aaa) emerges as a particularly useful indicator of the external ￿nance
premium and ￿nancial conditions more generally. On the other hand, using microeconomic data
on a sample of US ￿rms, Levin et al. (2004) provide an estimate of the premium over the most
recent business cycle. Table 2 and Figure 3 compare these indicators with our estimate of the
external ￿nance premium.12
Consider ￿rst the prime loan and corporate bond (Baa-Aaa) spreads. Overall, the relation
between our estimate of the premium and the former two series is weak. The contemporaneous
correlations amount to ￿37% (corporate) and ￿4% (prime). Nevertheless, they share a number
of important characteristics. For one, they all rise around the time of a recession. There is,
however, a di⁄erence in timing, especially with respect to the prime spread, which lags a cou-
to 250 basis points, see Table 1) dominate and prevent much insight stemming from such bounds.
11The fact that the premium is occasionaly negative in the late seventies, early eighties episode follows from the
dramatic rise in the Federal Funds rate, relative to which the premium is computed in the model. In the data for
this episode, negative spreads can also be observed when corporate bond rates are compared to the Funds rate,
rather than relative to a safe corporate bond rate.
12To ease comparison, all indicators are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation.
13ple of quarters.13 Second, the hike in the mid-sixties that was not followed by a recession is
observable in all three indicators. Similarly, the substantial decrease in the premium following
the 1973-75 recession is also apparent. In the late eighties, with the emergence of a market for
below investment grade corporate bonds, additional indicators come to the fore. Gertler and
Lown (1999) show that the high-yield spread is strongly associated with both general ￿nancial
conditions and the business cycle (as predicted by the ￿nancial accelerator). Along the lines of
their arguments, we believe this spread to be a more thorough indicator of the external ￿nance
premium, relative to the two proxies discussed above. In particular, the prime loan spread pro-
vides a poor indication of ￿nancing conditions of ￿rms typically considered vulnerable to ￿nancial
frictions. It focuses on ￿rms of the highest credit quality, to which ￿nancial constraints pertain
the least. The (Baa-Aaa) corporate bond spread accounts for this discrepancy to some extent,
by isolating developments speci￿c to ￿rms that have a less solid ￿nancial status. Evidently, this
argument holds a fortiori for the spreads of lower grade ￿rms. Hence, lower grade spreads should
be especially informative with respect to the external ￿nance premium. As shown in Table 2
and Figure 3, our estimate of the external ￿nance premium is more closely related to both the
Bbb-Aaa and the high-yield spread. Although our estimate misses most of the high frequency
movements in these spreads, the longer frequencies have more aligned patterns. Table 2 shows
that the correlation of our estimate with the Bbb-Aaa spread is 76% and amounts to as much
as 86% with the high-yield spread, which lags movements in our estimate considerably.
From the perspective of credit spreads, Table 2 has the following implications. First, the
high correlation with our estimate of the premium suggests that much of the movement in credit
spreads is related to macroeconomic ￿ uctuations. The model can be used to understand where
aggregate ￿ uctuations in credit spreads originate. Section 4.3 pursues this route by means of
13The lagging character of the prime spread is noticeable over the entire sample. In Table 2 the correlation
increases with lags of the premium (to 8% at a four quarter horizon), con￿rming the loan spread￿ s lagging
behaviour. The sluggish response of retail bank interest rates has spurred a vast amount of independent research
(see e.g., De Graeve et al., 2007, and the references therein). Moreover, starting in 1994, the prime spread ceases
to be a useful indicator of ￿uctuations in the external ￿nance premium. From then onwards the prime loan rate
is set as the federal funds rate plus 3 percent.
14variance and historical decompositions. Second, the fact that our estimate is leading with respect
to high-yield spreads indicates the model could also be useful in forecasting their aggregate
component.
We also compare our estimate of the external ￿nance premium with the one obtained by
Levin et al. (2004). They estimate the premium on the basis of micro data by exploiting the
microeconomic friction underlying the model of Bernanke et al. (1999). As in the case of the
high-yield spread, its behaviour and relation to our estimate of the premium are similar. In
particular, the correlation between the two spreads is again positive, with our estimate leading.
Admittedly, due to the limited overlap in sample period this observation should be treated with
caution. However, given the enormous di⁄erence in empirical approach, as well as the fact that
our estimate uses no ￿nancial market information, the similarity is comforting.
Finally, Table 2 and Figure 3 compare our estimate of the premium with two substantially
di⁄erent types of series, viz. non-interest rate series. First, we consider the change in credit
standards, which measures the net percent of loan o¢ cers reporting tightened credit standards.14
Although a survey of changes in credit standards provides little quantitative evidence on premia
that ￿rms need to pay for external ￿nance, it provides a clear indication of the strain that ￿rms
face in attaining external funds (Lown and Morgan, 2006).15 A post-1990 comparison between
the external ￿nance premium and the credit standards again reveals a high level of comovement.
In particular, the correlation is about 70%.16 Figure 3 shows that high frequency movements
14This measure is based on the Federal Reserve￿ s Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey.
15Note that the credit standards pertain to non-price terms. Lown and Morgan (2006) interpret it as a summary
measure that can provide information about the availability of credit. The Bernanke et al. (1999) model essentially
excludes credit rationing equilibria. As a result, if rationing were important over the sample, the model would
absorb this by a rise in the premium. Disentangling movements between price and non-price terms is beyond the
scope of this paper.
16In the second half of the eighties, the survey was not conducted. Prior to this period the comovement with
the premium is also apparent, yet to a lesser extent. One possible reason is that in the ￿rst decades the survey
was contaminated by a number of biases. One of these is that in the early years almost no contractions in credit
standards were reported (see Lown et al., 2000). This could explain the widening gap in the second half of the
seventies. That notwithstanding, within the pre-1984 period, the two series exhibit a number of similar peaks
15aside, both series convey very similar information. Second, we consider the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Here, too, long frequency movements are very much aligned. While the correlation does not
exceed 61%, Figure 3 shows that, the late seventies aside, the debt-to-gdp ratio and our estimate
of the premium have very similar cycles.
In sum, our estimate of the premium for external ￿nance seems to have substantial realistic
content, even though the model estimation incorporates no information about the evolution of
￿nancial variables. Moreover, our estimate of the external ￿nance premium is closely related to
readily available proxies of the premium and other indicators of strain on corporations￿access
to external ￿nance. Using macroeconomic data we establish roughly the same behaviour of the
external ￿nance premium as Levin et al. (2004), who estimate ￿rm-level premia. Due to the
span of the data in the present analysis, however, we are able to generalize these properties
over a more comprehensive set of economic cycles. Additionally, by estimating the premium
on the basis of macroeconomic data, it should cover the entirety of US ￿rms. By contrast,
other indicators typically pertain to a speci￿c subset of ￿rms.17 An interesting byproduct of our
approach follows from distilling the premium out of a full-￿ edged DSGE model. Hence, one can
interpret movements in the premium in relation to structural shocks driving the economy, as the
next section illustrates.
4.3 Decomposing the premium
Table 3 and Figures 4 and 5 provide variance and historical decompositions of the external ￿nance
premium and GDP. Such decompositions provide insight into the manner in which the model
interprets movements of the premium and the business cycle.
First, it seems that investment supply shocks are the primary source of ￿ uctuations in the
premium. In the short run they account for about two-thirds of the forecast error variance of the
and troughs, as well as correlations above 40%.
17This economy-wide coverage can rationalize a number of observations related to the model. First, by means of
the law of large numbers, it is consistent with our estimate of the premium not sharing high-frequency movements
observed in indicators for subsets of ￿rms. Second, this wide coverage possibly generates the wide range of the
highest posterior density region of the steady state cost of external ￿nance, ￿ RK.
16premium. At longer horizons, this percentage increases to over 90%. The historical decomposition
of the premium in Figure 4 con￿rms that investment supply shocks are responsible for the bulk
of variations in the external ￿nance premium. The graph traces the low frequency component of
the premium very closely. Not only for the premium, but also for the business cycle the role of
investment supply shocks is substantial. We ￿nd that the contribution of these shocks to GDP
ranges from a lower bound of 14% (at long horizon) to an upper bound of 37% (immediate). This
is in line with the ￿ndings of Greenwood et al. (2000). They attribute up to 30% of business
cycle ￿ uctuations to these shocks. Moreover, the substantial increases in the premium due to "I
in the second half of the sample (Figure 4) are consistent with the increased role of technological
investment since the mid-seventies (Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997).
Second, monetary policy shocks also cause a great deal of movements in the premium. Table
3 shows that the in￿ ation objective (￿￿) and monetary policy (￿R) shock jointly account for up
to 25% of the short run ￿ uctuations of the premium.
Historical contributions, shown in Figures 4 and 5, also shed light on the properties of the
model and the external ￿nance premium. For instance, the economic expansion in the second
half of the nineties is mostly driven by investment speci￿c technological progress and a favourable
stance of monetary policy. During the same episode, the investment supply shock was the main
factor in driving the external ￿nance premium up to its peak prior to the 2001 recession. Going
back further in time, monetary policy played a major role in the two early eighties￿recessions.
The model attributes both the fall in GDP and the rise in the premium to restrictive monetary
policy shocks.
Finally, we also ￿nd a small, yet signi￿cant contribution of preference shocks (3 ￿ 10%)
to the short horizon variance decomposition of the premium. Another minor portion (6% on
average) of the high frequency movements in the premium is generated by labour supply shocks.
Productivity, government spending as well as both mark-up shocks have only minor e⁄ects on the
premium. The price and wage mark-up shocks also have a small e⁄ect on output ￿ uctuations. The
government spending shock, by contrast, generates most of the short horizon and a substantial
17part of the long horizon forecast error variance of GDP.
5 Financial frictions and the macroeconomy
The previous section highlighted that a DSGE model with ￿nancial frictions can generate plau-
sible implications for the external ￿nance premium. This section assesses the contribution of
￿nancial frictions to macroeconomic ￿ uctuations more generally. We ￿rst measure the model￿ s
statistical performance relative to a more standard New Keynesian DSGE model without ￿nan-
cial market imperfections and to a reduced form VAR. Next, we document the contribution of
￿nancial frictions to the transmission of shocks. Finally, we discuss the cyclical behaviour of the
external ￿nance premium in the model.
5.1 Comparing ￿t across models
In order to assess statistical model performance, we ￿rst compute marginal densities and root
mean squared errors (RMSE) for three di⁄erent models. In particular, Table 4 compares the
performance of the DSGE model with ￿nancial frictions to the DSGE model without ￿nancial
frictions, as well as with a reduced form VAR(1).18
This comparison suggests the model with the ￿nancial accelerator performs best in matching
the dynamic behaviour of (Y , C, I, W, L, P, R). In particular, both DSGE models clearly
outperform the VAR, as witnessed by the substantial reduction in RMSE for all variables. The
marginal likelihood of the VAR is also substantially lower than that of both DSGE models. Turn-
ing to the DSGE models we observe a better overall performance when the model incorporates
￿nancial frictions, as indicated by the marginal likelihood. Table 4 shows that for the RMSE the
picture is mixed, with relative gains at some horizons and losses at others for consumption, inter-
est rates and in￿ ation. Nevertheless, in overall terms, the model with ￿nancial frictions seems to
forecast better. For investment, GDP, wages and hours worked the model with ￿nancial frictions
performs best at all forecast horizons.
18A one period lag length is optimal both in terms of data density and RMSE.
18To pinpoint more precisely which variables are better captured by incorporating ￿nancial
frictions, Figure 6 compares empirical cross-correlations between the observable data series with
those implied by the two estimated DSGE models.19 Perhaps not surprisingly, the largest dif-
ference between the model with ￿nancial friction and the one without relates to investment
dynamics. The autocorrelation and cross-correlation patterns of investment seem to be better
captured by the model with ￿nancial frictions. The con￿dence bands for the baseline model
always contain the empirical correlations, which is not the case for the model without ￿nancial
frictions. A second di⁄erence suggests that incorporating ￿nancial frictions may also come at
a cost. The correlations of consumption with wages and labour become borderline when the
model incorporates ￿nancial frictions. The substantial width of the bands for the model without
￿nancial frictions, however, should caution for drawing too sharp inference in this respect. At
the least, the overall increase in marginal likelihood suggests the gain in ￿tting the dynamics
of investment is much larger than the latter cost. For the remaining correlations, incorporating
￿nancial frictions does not seem to a⁄ect the DSGE model￿ s properties signi￿cantly.
In sum, ￿nancial frictions help the DSGE model in the overall description of macroeconomic
data. The largest gain is obtained in capturing investment dynamics. Christensen and Dib
(2008) and Queijo (2006) also favour model speci￿cations that incorporate ￿nancial frictions.
Meier and M￿ller (2006), by contrast, ￿nd the ￿nancial accelerator to contribute only marginally
to describing the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks. Since the latter study matches a conditional
moment of the data (i.c. the response to a monetary policy shock) and the former unconditional
moments, our result that monetary policy shocks are not the predominant source of ￿ uctuations
in the external ￿nance premium can reconcile the two seemingly opposing results.
5.2 Comparing transmission across models
To better appreciate the contribution of ￿nancial frictions to the DSGE model, we here study
the transmission of shocks more deeply. Figures 7 through 10 plot impulse responses to a variety
19The cross-correlation functions are calculated based on VAR￿ s estimated on 100000 simulated datasamples
(see, e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003).
19of structural shocks for three di⁄erent models. The ￿rst model considered is the baseline model
with ￿nancial frictions. The second model is the same as the ￿rst, but in which the ￿nancial
transmission channel is shut down. Impulse responses for this model are computed at the esti-
mated values of the baseline model under the additional restriction that ￿ = 0 and ￿ RK = 1
￿.20
The third model is a model in which there are no ￿nancial frictions, and is estimated under
that assumption. This model corresponds to the DSGE model without ￿nancial frictions of the
previous section.
Figure 7 shows the response to a preference shock in the three models. The responses of
asset prices, consumption and output are largely similar for each model. The major di⁄erence
is observed in the responses of net worth, the external ￿nance premium and investment. In
particular, the fall in asset prices reduces net worth in the baseline model, and thereby raises
the premium. As a result, the drop in investment is much larger relative to both models without
￿nancial frictions, in which the premium is zero. This response is the prototype e⁄ect of the
￿nancial accelerator documented by Bernanke et al. (1999).
Next, Figure 8 plots the response to a temporary monetary policy impulse. Similar to VAR-
type responses, investment, consumption and output all rise. In the baseline model this is
accompanied by a low premium for external ￿nance. At the peak, the investment response
is ampli￿ed relative to the model where the ￿nancial channel is shut o⁄. This is again the
mechanism documented by Bernanke et al. (1999). Di⁄erent from the latter is that the baseline
investment response is no longer uniformly stronger than the response in the model with ￿nancial
frictions shut down. The ￿gure reveals that investment peaks earlier in the model with ￿nancial
frictions, relative to the same model with the ￿nancial channel shut down. This result di⁄ers
from Bernanke et al. (1999) and other existing research (e.g. Walentin, 2005; Meier and M￿ller,
2005; Christensen and Dib, 2008; Queijo, 2006). It turns out that one of the real frictions, in
particular investment adjustment costs, is at the root of this di⁄erence. The above literature
20Conditional on credit frictions being absent, the values of ￿ and
￿ K
￿ N are irrelevant. In this case, they only
contribute to the evolution of net worth, which is then immaterial. Moreover, the latter ratio is, by the Modigliani-
Miller theorem, indeterminate. The ￿gures therefore contain no response for both net worth and the premium.
20invariably works with capital adjustment costs.
In general, investment adjustment costs make it optimal to postpone the investment peak for
some time. As a result, DSGE models can mimick the gradual, hump-shaped response of invest-
ment to a monetary impulse found in the data (see Christiano et al., 2005). The ￿nancial friction
of Bernanke et al. (1999) provides no alternative mechanism for such a response. However, the
two frictions do interact. In particular, the fall in the external ￿nance premium -which lasts only
so long- induces investment to peak sooner relative to the model without ￿nancial frictions. Part
of the increased cost of raising the ￿ ow of investment is compensated by the low cost of external
￿nance.
Put di⁄erently, because changing the ￿ ow of investment is costly, temporary ￿ uctuations in
the external ￿nance premium will have less impact on the economy, relative to a model with
capital adjustment costs. To that extent, investment adjustment costs serve as a substitute for
the ￿nancial friction. However, it should be clear from the increase in model performance due
to the inclusion of ￿nancial frictions that there is a role for them in addition to investment
adjustment costs.
Next, consider the response to investment supply shocks in Figure 9. In the standard model
without ￿nancial frictions, the innovation in the investment technology serves to increase invest-
ment, while lowering the price of capital (hence the term investment supply shock). This holds
irrespective of whether the model is re-estimated or not. A similar response is also observed for
the model with ￿nancial frictions. However, the fall in asset prices now also reduces net worth,
thereby increasing entrepreneurial borrowing needs. The resulting rise in the cost of external
￿nance dissuades investment relative to the case without ￿nancial frictions.21
21After a number of periods, the response of investment to an investment supply shock becomes negative.
This pattern is similar to the credit cycles of Kyotaki and Moore (1997) and is also found in Greenwood et al.
(2000). The reason is that the substantial fall in the price of capital (or rise in relative e¢ ciency of investment)
advances the optimal timing of investment. That is, investment takes place when capital and productivity gains
are highest, which is directly after the shock hits the economy. Once capital gains have vanished, the persistently
high premium for external ￿nance maintains a negative e⁄ect on investment, and at long horizons even on the
level of capital.
21Finally, consider the e⁄ects of productivity shocks, shown in Figure 10. The most remarkable
di⁄erence in responses among all models is that of investment, which is substantially lower in
the model with ￿nancial frictions. This constrasts sharply with results in Bernanke et al. (1999)
or Walentin (2005), in which favourable productivity shocks reduce the premium and therefore
boost investment relative to a model without ￿nancial frictions. Once more, the primary reason
for the di⁄erent responses lies in the form of adjustment costs.
Investment adjustment costs make the adjustment costs dynamic, contrary to the case of
capital adjustment costs. If investment is positive today, it will be positive for a prolonged
period, in order to minimize costs associated with changing its ￿ ow. In case of the productivity
shock, investment that is high for a long time, implies that the capital stock outgrows net worth,
thereby increasing borrowing needs. The result is an increase in the external ￿nance premium.
Because long lasting positive investment will be costly due to a high future premium for external
￿nance, investment will be lower in all periods, including current ones where the premium is low.
The similar investment response in both models without ￿nancial frictions shows that the rise in
the premium is the source of this change. The lower response of investment in the model with
￿nancial frictions is compensated by a larger consumption response, resulting in not too di⁄erent
output responses over the di⁄erent models.
5.3 The cyclical behaviour of the external ￿nance premium
A ￿nal noteworthy feature of the model is that the premium is not necessarily countercyclical.
This ￿nding contrasts with earlier studies of the Bernanke et al. (1999) model, such as Walentin
(2005). The latter ￿nds a countercyclical external ￿nance premium, both conditionally and
unconditionally. The impulse responses provided above help to understand the source of this
di⁄erence in cyclicality.
For the monetary policy shock, the impulse responses are qualitatively similar to those of
Bernanke et al. (1999): an exogenous rise in the interest rate lowers asset prices and net worth.
Since ￿rms are leveraged, net worth falls more than asset prices and ￿rms￿borrowing needs
22(BN = ^ Q+ ^ K￿ ^ N) increase. Because the stake of the entrepreneur in the project is now relatively
low, the premium required by the ￿nancial intermediary rises, thus depressing investment and
ultimately output. As a result, the premium is countercyclical conditional on a monetary policy
shock. Moreover, because of additional real and nominal frictions relative to Bernanke et al.
(1999) the model produces hump shaped responses for the real variables. As a result, the leading
character of the premium relative to the business cycle arises naturally in the model: while output
responds relatively slowly due to real (and nominal) frictions, the premium reacts instantaneously
to shocks hitting the economy.
For the investment supply shock, the previous section already documented how the rise in
investment is not as strong in the model with ￿nancial frictions. Note, however, that the positive
e⁄ect of the shock on investment is not overturned by the increase in the premium. As a result,
both investment and the premium rise. These impulse responses explain economic expansions
in the wake of increases in the external ￿nance premium or, in other words, the possibility of a
procyclical premium.
There are a number of additional reasons why the cyclical behaviour of the premium in the
present model is not clear cut a priori. First note that, on impact, all shocks induce an opposite
movement between investment and the external ￿nance premium (except "I, which exogenously
raises investment and simultaneously raises the premium, see above). Shocks that increase asset
prices, reduce borrowing needs and therefore the premium. Holding everything else constant,
investment will rise in order to equalize the cost of external ￿nance and the return to capital.
This is the mechanism documented by Walentin (2005) and works for a countercyclical premium.
Second, as time passes the capital stock grows and capital gains vanish. However, it is not
necessary in the model for borrowing needs to immediately revert to their mean. The response
of the external ￿nance premium (a function of ^ N, ^ Q and ^ K) depends on the estimated ￿nancial
parameters as well as the other frictions in the model. While the ￿nancial parameters determine
the persistence of net worth ( ^ N), the other frictions in the model in￿ uence, among other things,
the responses of the capital stock and its price ( ^ K and ^ Q). Hence, the relative response of QK
23versus N and thereby the cyclicality of the premium is a⁄ected by the types of real and nominal
frictions present in the model. The previous section documented, for instance, the crucial role
of adjustment costs.
A third and more obvious reason why GDP and the premium do not always move in opposite
directions is the presence of other shocks. In particular, a number of shocks generate output
e⁄ects via channels other than investment. In the present model, for instance, the government
spending shock plays virtually no role in the variance decomposition of the premium while
a⁄ecting GDP substantially (Table 3). In the data, where all shocks operate simultaneously,
the negligible e⁄ect of "G on the external ￿nance premium can be easily o⁄set by any other
shock. At the same time, this other shock may ￿nd it hard to counter the output e⁄ect of
the government spending shock. The role of other shocks in the cyclicality in the premium
can also be inferred from related studies. In Christensen and Dib (2008), the preference shock
boosts consumption more than it crowds out investment, implying a conditionally procyclical
external ￿nance premium. Related, Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Meeks (2007) have introduced
additional stochastics within the framework of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) that alter the cyclical
behaviour of the premium.
6 Conclusion
The main objective of this paper lies in providing an estimate of the external ￿nance premium.
Existing research has tackled the unobservability of the premium in two ways. On the one hand,
the literature has suggested indicators from ￿nancial markets, such as corporate bond spreads,
to study ￿ uctuations in the external ￿nance premium. On the other hand, combining corporate
bond and balance sheet data with a micro model of ￿nancial frictions, Levin et al. (2004) provide
an estimate of the premium for a sample of US ￿rms.
Our approach infers the external ￿nance premium from a DSGE model estimated on US
macroeconomic data. The estimate provides insight into historical ￿ uctuations of the external
￿nance premium. Distilling the premium from a full-￿ edged DSGE model allows to interpret
24these ￿ uctuations in terms of shocks driving business cycles.
The estimated average post-WWII premium for external ￿nance is 130 basis points. We
￿nd substantial variation in the premium. In particular, the premium typically rises prior to a
recession. The sources of these ￿ uctuations can be mainly attributed to the e⁄ects of investment-
speci￿c technological progress and contractionary monetary policy shocks. Overall, we ￿nd
strong comovement with high-yield corporate bond spreads, existing micro estimates and non-
price indicators of ￿nancial strain in the corporate sector. More speci￿cally, the model seems to
capture lower frequency movements in these indicators particularly well.
The analysis also shows that there may be interactions between the various types of shocks
and frictions in the model. In particular, concerning the transmission of shocks, we ￿nd that
incorporating the ￿nancial friction of Bernanke et al. (1999) in a model with investment adjust-
ment costs may give rise to a ￿nancial ￿decelerator￿ , conditional on some shocks. This di⁄ers
from models which assume capital adjustment costs and invariably generate a ￿nancial acceler-
ator mechanism, irrespective of the shock considered. In addition, the paper highlights how this
feature may a⁄ect the cyclicality of the external ￿nance premium.
Our results have a number of broader implications: First, the estimate of the external ￿nance
premium is derived from pure macro data and the internal restrictions of the DSGE model, with
no use of ￿nancial information whatsoever. The consequent surprisingly high degree of realism
that the estimated external ￿nance premium displays, suggests that DSGE models could go
a long way in capturing ￿nancial phenomena. Second, the relative importance of the various
structural shocks in explaining ￿ uctuations in the premium, provides a framework for thinking
about ways to improve micro models that aim to capture corporate bond spreads. In particular,
￿rm-speci￿c corporate credit spread changes are notoriously di¢ cult to explain. Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001) attribute around 75% of these changes to a common, yet unknown factor. The
strong commonalities between average credit spreads and our estimate of the premium, suggest
that a signi￿cant portion of that unknown component can be traced back to structural economic
shocks driving business cycles.
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Figure 1: Data 
 Figure 2: The External Finance Premium 
 
  
Figure 3: The External Finance Premium (solid line) and Alternative Indicators (+) 
 
  
Figure 4: Historical Contributions to External Finance Premium (90% probability bands) 
 
  
Figure 5: Historical Contributions to GDP (90% probability bands) 
 


























































































































































































































 Figure 7: Preference Shock IRF: Baseline (solid), Baseline without financial friction (o), DSGE estimated without financial friction (--). 
 
  
Figure 8: Monetary Policy Shock IRF: Baseline (solid), Baseline without financial friction (o), DSGE estimated without financial friction (--). 
 
  
Figure 9: Investment Supply Shock IRF: Baseline (solid), Baseline without financial friction (o), DSGE estimated without financial friction (--). 
 
  





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6Table 3: Variance decompositions: 5%-95% bounds
Output Premium
Shock t = 1 t = 10 t = 20 t = 1 t = 10 t = 20
^ "A
t 0:01 ￿ 0:04 0:11 ￿ 0:24 0:16 ￿ 0:33 0:00 ￿ 0:03 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:02
^ "B
t 0:08 ￿ 0:16 0:02 ￿ 0:05 0:01 ￿ 0:03 0:03 ￿ 0:10 0:00 ￿ 0:03 0:00 ￿ 0:02
"G
t 0:31 ￿ 0:44 0:09 ￿ 0:17 0:08 ￿ 0:16 0:00 ￿ 0:02 0:00 ￿ 0:00 0:00 ￿ 0:01
^ "I
t 0:25 ￿ 0:37 0:18 ￿ 0:37 0:14 ￿ 0:30 0:58 ￿ 0:83 0:86 ￿ 0:98 0:89 ￿ 0:97
^ "L
t 0:04 ￿ 0:11 0:11 ￿ 0:28 0:11 ￿ 0:29 0:02 ￿ 0:10 0:00 ￿ 0:03 0:00 ￿ 0:02
￿￿
t 0:01 ￿ 0:03 0:02 ￿ 0:06 0:02 ￿ 0:06 0:01 ￿ 0:05 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:01
￿R
t 0:05 ￿ 0:11 0:11 ￿ 0:24 0:10 ￿ 0:24 0:06 ￿ 0:21 0:01 ￿ 0:07 0:01 ￿ 0:05
￿P
t 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:01 ￿ 0:02 0:00 ￿ 0:02 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:00 0:00 ￿ 0:00
￿W
t 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:00 0:00 ￿ 0:00 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:01Table 4: Percentage gain (+) / loss (-) in RMSE and marginal density
Y C I L P W R
DSGE without ￿nancial friction vs. VAR(1)
1Q 17.43 10.00 13.65 13.28 16.83 0.75 13.00
2Q 25.71 27.28 13.90 14.74 35.56 1.88 13.26
4Q 32.73 43.75 9.96 17.74 48.26 1.99 16.11
8Q 46.88 63.46 11.58 22.19 36.01 9.69 20.13
DSGE with ￿nancial friction vs. VAR(1)
1Q 24.29 10.70 16.08 19.26 22.04 2.39 8.99
2Q 39.52 29.28 18.91 25.70 41.07 4.80 12.02
4Q 48.30 44.23 16.65 31.48 50.35 5.78 19.03
8Q 59.73 56.48 22.12 39.09 34.35 13.99 25.18
DSGE with vs. without ￿nancial friction
1Q 8.30 0.77 2.82 6.91 6.27 1.65 -4.61
2Q 18.59 2.74 5.82 12.86 8.55 2.98 -1.43
4Q 23.15 0.86 7.43 16.71 4.04 3.87 3.47
8Q 24.20 -19.11 11.91 21.72 -2.60 4.77 6.32
Marginal likelihood
VAR(1) -1003.8
DSGE without ￿nancial friction -944.9
DSGE with ￿nancial friction -933.1
Note: Sample period is 1954:Q1 to 2004:Q4. For the computation of RMSE the forecasting period is 1990:Q1 to 2004:4.
The VAR is re-estimated every quarter, the DSGE models every four quarters. For the computation of the marginal
likelihood the ￿rst ten years (1954:Q1 to 1963:Q4) serve as a training sample.